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FRANCHISE LAW
Deborah S. Coldwell*
Jan S. Gilbert**
Carl E. Zwisler***
Robert A. Lauer****
Ryan Cox*****
Altresha Q. Burchett-Williams******
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article provides an update of case law and legislative efforts
that had, or will have, a significant impact on franchise and dealer-
ship law in Texas and in the Fifth Circuit. Of note, the biggest
development in franchising occurred after the Survey period for this arti-
cle, namely a January 23, 2007, announcement that the revised Federal
Franchise Rule will be effective July 1, 2007, with mandatory application
on July 1, 2008. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is-
sued a Notice of Public Rulemaking on a proposed trade-regulation rule
for business opportunities. Both are discussed below.
With respect to case law, the Texas Supreme Court overturned a jury's
finding that a soft drink company committed certain antitrust violations
in connection with its marketing agreements with retailers. Also, the
Fifth Circuit and the Western District of Texas upheld arbitration clauses
and forum-selection clauses in franchise agreements further strengthen-
ing the general consensus in Texas that contractual provisions regarding
dispute resolution will be enforced. Finally, the United States Supreme
Court effectively limited the scope of price discrimination liability in a
case where a truck manufacturer was accused of violating the Robinson-
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Patman Act by providing more favorable discounts, or price concessions,
to some of its regional dealers than to others.
II. FRANCHISE BASICS
A. AMENDED FTC FRANCHISE RULE RELEASED-FINALLY!
Franchise disclosure laws require franchisors to disclose to prospective
franchisees certain items about the franchise system.1 The guidelines set
forth by the North American Securities Administrators Association
("NASAA") require franchisors to provide specific information about
their officers, the franchise system, the relationship between the
franchisor and the franchisee, and the documents the franchisee will be
required to sign. 2 This information is contained in a document called the
Uniform Franchise Offering Circular ("UFOC"). The FTC has its own
form of disclosure format under the Franchise Rule3 but has accepted the
UFOC disclosure format in lieu of its own.4
The Franchise Rule was adopted in 1978. In 1995, however, the FTC
began reviewing the Franchise Rule to determine whether changes were
necessary. If it was determined that changes were necessary, the FTC
said it would revise the Franchise Rule. In 1997, the FTC published an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking5 and, two years later, pub-
lished a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,6 containing the first draft of
proposed changes to the Franchise Rule.
After a prolonged gestation and comment period, the FTC finally pub-
lished its Amended Franchising Rule (the "Amended Rule") on January
23, 2007. 7 The new disclosures may be used effective July 1, 2007, and
they must be used for all franchises offered or sold after July 1, 2008.8 The
Amended Rule prescribes a disclosure format, which largely mirrors the
UFOC format, and modifies it in certain places by adding new disclo-
sures. The FTC plans to publish compliance guidelines, which will use
1. RUPERT M. BARKOFF & ANDREW C. SELDEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING
121-22 (ABA Publishing 2004).
2. Id. at 98-99.
3. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (2004).
4. Rupert M. Barkoff, Mary Beth Brody & Lane Fisher, The Basics of Disclosure,
IFA 37th Annual Legal Symposium, Tab 8, ii-iii (May 23-25, 2004); FTC Summary of the
Franchise Rule, Paragraph F., reprinted in CCH Business Franchise Guide Paragraph 6027.
5. Trade Regulation Rule on Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 62 Fed. Reg. 9,115 (1997) (the "Current
Rule").
6. Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,294 (Oct. 22, 1999).
7. Portions of this discussion about the Amended Rule were previously published by
the Haynes and Boone Franchise and Distribution Group on Haynes and Boone's website.
See Carl E. Zwisler and Jan S. Gilbert, Amended FTC Rule Released Yesterday (Jan. 24,
2007) http://www.haynesboone.com/FILES/tbl sl2PublicationsHotTopics/ publicationPDF
60/1855/Amended%2OFTC%2ORule.pdf. The "Amended Rule" was published by the
FTC as a part of a 398 page Report http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/R511003FranchiseRule
FRNotice.pdf (the "Report").
8. Report, supra note 7, at 1.
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the current UFOC guidelines as their point of departure. 9
Franchisors will favorably receive many aspects of the Amended Rule.
Requirements related to the delivery of disclosures will be welcomed by
all, while exemptions for high-investment franchises and for sales to cer-
tain high net worth franchisees will eliminate compliance obligations alto-
gether for some franchisors. Franchisors will be allowed to use electronic
means to deliver disclosure documents. Financial Performance Repre-
sentations (i.e., earnings claims) remain optional, not mandatory. New
franchisors may continue to phase into the financial audit requirement if
they have not previously had audits.
The Amended Rule has addressed many of the concerns raised by the
franchising community since the Revised Proposed Rule was issued in
1999. For example, thresholds for large-investment franchises have been
lowered, and the number of franchisor employees, who are entitled to
qualify for a new exemption, have been expanded. Franchisee advocates
will appreciate added prohibitions concerning the use of merger and inte-
gration clauses to deflect liability for disclosures made in offering circu-
lars. They also will like several new disclosure requirements, and they
should like being able to negotiate amendments to franchise agreements
at a closing without being subject to a five business-day delay.
1. New Exemptions
The Amended Rule creates several new exclusions and exemptions,
including:
1. Sales of franchises to be located outside the United States; 10
2. Franchises involving investments of at least $1 million (excluding
unimproved land and amounts financed by the franchisor). This ini-
tial investment would be calculated to include multi-unit develop-
ment commitments and the value of a business, which is converted to
a franchise through an affiliation franchise agreement;1 1
3. Investments by high net worth, experienced franchisees, i.e.,
those with five years of business experience and a net worth of at
least $5 million; 12 and
4. Sales to certain officers, owners, and managers of franchisors. 13
2. No More Broker Disclosures or Venue/Law Choice Risk Factors
Franchisors that use franchise brokers will find that their burdens are
relaxed considerably, as disclosures about franchise brokers are no longer
required. 14 The UFOC's required use of "risk factors" based upon a
franchisor's choice of law or venue for disputes no longer will be required
9. Id. at 15-16.
10. See Amended Rule § 436.2.
11. Amended Rule § 436.8(5)( i).
12. Amended Rule § 436.8(5)( ii).
13. Amended Rule § 436.8(6).
14. Report, supra note 7, at 90.
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either.15
2. Timing and Delivery of Disclosures Simplified
The rules for when disclosures must be given to prospective franchisees
also provide a welcome change. The duty to provide a disclosure at the
"first personal meeting" has been deleted, and the cumbersome ten busi-
ness day counting problem has been eliminated. Now, disclosures must
be provided fourteen calendar days before the franchisee makes a pay-
ment to the franchisor or an affiliate in connection with a franchise
purchase, or fourteen days before the franchisee signs a binding agree-
ment with the franchisor. 16 However, if a prospective franchisee "reason-
ably requests" a disclosure document earlier than fourteen days before
the agreement is signed or money is paid, he is entitled to receive it ear-
lier.17 Completed agreements must be provided to prospects seven days
before signing, only if the franchisor has unilaterally made a change to
the standard form agreement provided with the disclosure document.
18
Disclosure documents may be delivered in electronic form without any
of the accompanying notices required in earlier drafts of the Proposed
Rule.19 The Amended Rule even creates a presumption that paper or
tangible copies of a disclosure are received three days after they have
been mailed with the proper postage and address.20
4. New Disclosure Highlights
The new disclosure requirements include:
1. Information about the franchisor's parent in items 1, 3, and 4.21
Financial statements of the parent must be included if the parent will
provide services to franchisees or if a parent guarantees obligations
of the franchisor;22
2. Information about franchisor-initiated litigation against franchis-
ees. Disclosure must cover the franchisor's previous fiscal year
only;23
3. Information about the franchisor's use of confidentiality
clauses;24
4. Information about the existence of "trademark-specific fran-
chisee associations; '25
5. Franchisee turnover information will be presented in a way
which will substantially reduce the likelihood of "double counting"
15. Id. at 14.
16. Amended Rule § 4362(a).
17. Amended Rule § 436.9(e).
18. Amended Rule § 436.2(b).
19. Amended Rule § 436.2(c).
20. Amended Rule § 436.2(c)( 3).
21. Amended Rule §§ 436.5(a), (c), (d).
22. Amended Rule § 436.5(u)( 1)( v).
23. Amended Rule § 436.5(c)( 1).
24. Amended Rule § 436.5(t)( 7).
25. Amended Rule § 436.5(t)( 8).
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transfers and terminations; 26 and
6. Annual updates to disclosures are not required until 120 days
after a franchisor's fiscal year end. 27
5. New Prohibitions
The Amended Rule contains several new prohibitions. Franchisors
may no longer require a prospective franchisee to waive reliance on any
representation made in a disclosure document, its exhibits, or its amend-
ments. 28 The use of "shills" to promote franchises also is prohibited. 29
6. Conclusion
These highlights of changes to the Rule are just that. The Amended
Rule is part of a 398-page document, which contains the details with
which franchisors and their lawyers will need to become familiar to meet
the new requirements. Still unknown is exactly how quickly states with
franchise registration laws will be able to adapt to the changes and the
extent to which they will require additional information.
B. NEW FTC BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES RULE
On April 12, 2006, the FTC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
("NPR") seeking public comment on a proposed trade-regulation rule for
business opportunities. The NPR sets forth certain disclosures that busi-
ness opportunity sellers would be required to provide to prospective pur-
chasers to assist in creating an informed purchase decision. In addition to
these disclosure requirements, the proposed rule would prohibit common
deceptive business opportunity sales practices. 30
Among other things, the new business opportunities rule would require
a one-page disclosure covering five specific points: (1) whether or not
sellers make earnings claims, and if so, whether sellers are required to
provide substantiation and make additional disclosures; (2) a list of any
criminal or civil actions against the seller or its representatives that in-
volve fraud, misrepresentations, securities, or deceptive or unfair trade
practices; (3) whether the seller has in place cancellation or refund poli-
cies and such policies' terms; (4) the total number of purchasers in the
past two years and the number of those purchasers seeking a refund or
cancellation in that time period; and (5) a list of business opportunity
seller references. 31
In addition to the required disclosures, the proposed rule would pro-
hibit sellers of business opportunities from misrepresenting a laundry list
26. Amended Rule § 436.5(t)( 2).
27. Amended Rule § 436.7(a).
28. Amended Rule § 436.9(h).
29. See Amended Rule § 436.9(b).
30. Business Opportunity Rule; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 70 Fed. Reg. 19,054
(2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437).
31. Id. at 19,058.
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of points, including: (1) earnings; (2) costs or the efficacy, nature, or cen-
tral characteristics of the business opportunity or the goods and services
sold to the purchaser as part of the business opportunity; (3) cancellation
or refund policies; (4) promised assistance; (5) the calculation and distri-
bution of commissions, bonuses, incentives, premiums, or other payments
from the seller; (6) the likelihood of finding locations for equipment or
accounts for services; (7) a business opportunity as an offer of employ-
ment; (8) territorial exclusivity or more limited territorial protections; (9)
endorsements; and (10) shills as references. 32 Further, the proposed rule
would prohibit business opportunity sellers from failing to make prom-
ised refunds, as well as assigning "to any purchaser a purported exclusive
territory that, in fact, encompasses the same or overlapping areas already
assigned to another purchaser. ' '33
While the proposed business opportunity rule would streamline disclo-
sures that currently must conform with the Franchise Rule, the scope of
the proposed business opportunity rule is extremely broad since it has no
minimum cost threshold, no inventory exemption, and no limit on scope
based on the type of assistance promised as part of the offer. Further, the
scope is not limited to transactions where the purchaser of the opportu-
nity sells goods or services directly to end-users other than the business
opportunity seller.34
III. PROCEDUURE
A. JURISDICTION
At times, corporate leaders seek to shield themselves from jurisdiction
in a foreign state when they act in their corporate capacity. A corporate
officer, however, may be subject to specific jurisdiction, even in a foreign
state, based on their alleged acts or omissions that give rise to tort claims.
In Lewis v. Indian Springs Land Corporation ("ISLC"),35 plaintiff
Thomas E. Lewis, a Florida resident, challenged a trial court's order over-
ruling his special appearance. In particular, Lewis argued that: (1) he was
a Florida resident; (2) he served as President of ISLC, a Nevada corpora-
tion; (3) the corporation received certain contested funds in Florida; and
(4) he was acting in his capacity as president of ISLC when he issued
checks from a Florida bank account to ISLC's acknowledged creditors,
some of whom lived in Texas. 36
Several corporate entities and shareholders, which Lewis served as a
partner, venture, or shareholder, initiated a lawsuit against Lewis regard-
ing his distribution of ISLC funds. The transactions between the parties
related to the acquisition and development of a tract of residential real
estate location in Los Angeles County, California. Specifically, on Au-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See 71 Fed. Reg. 19,054.
35. 175 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
36. Id. at 912.
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gust 12, 2004, Lewis, acting as ISLC's President, negotiated and obtained
an agreement whereby Toll Brothers, Inc. made a partial payment on a
promissory note payable to ISLC of over $9 million. Toll Brothers made
this payment to ISLC's Miami bank account, on which Lewis was a signa-
tory. Lewis then distributed over $3 million of that money into his per-
sonal Florida bank account and sent six checks to Dallas-payable to two
Texas residents and a Texas corporation. The two Texas residents
claimed they had no knowledge that Lewis negotiated these prepayments
until their checks were received. Upon receipt, these Texas residents no-
tified Lewis that he had improperly distributed these funds. They
claimed that Lewis deliberately ignored other debts that should have
been paid, in particular, certain alleged obligations to repay advances
made by a Texas resident for the development of the California
property. 37
The Dallas Court of Appeals explained that the Texas long-arm statue
permits Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
that does business in Texas. 38 The long-arm statute defines "doing busi-
ness" as: (1) contracting by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident with
performance either in whole or in part in Texas; (2) commission of a tort
in whole or in part in Texas; (3) recruitment of Texas residents directly or
though an intermediary located in Texas; or (4) performance of any other
act that may constitute doing business.39 The court of appeals concluded
that "the broad language of the long-arm statute permits Texas courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction 'as far as the federal constitutional require-
ments of due process will permit." 40 The court of appeals further ex-
plained that the "touchstone" of jurisdictional due-process analysis is
"purposeful availment. ' '4 1
The court of appeals noted that the Texas Supreme Court recently ad-
dressed the proper application of the concept of "purposeful availment"
outlining three important aspects to be considered:42
First, it is only the defendant's contacts with the forum that count:
purposeful availment "ensures that a defendant will not be haled
into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ... the unilateral activity of
another party or a third person." Second, the acts relied upon must
be "purposeful" rather than "random, isolated or fortuitous." Third,
a defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by "avail-
ing" itself of the jurisdiction.43
The court of appeals pointed out that the Michiana court held that a non-
resident may purposefully avoid a jurisdiction, rather than purposefully
37. Id. at 909-12.
38. Id. at 913; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.041-.045 (Vernon 1997).
39. § 17.042.
40. Lewis, 175 S.W.3d at 913 (quoting id.).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 913-14.
43. Id. at 914 (quoting Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777,
785 (Tex. 2005)) (citations omitted).
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avail itself of a jurisdiction, by structuring its transactions so as neither to
profit from the forum's law nor be subject to its jurisdiction.44
The court of appeals held that Lewis had purposefully availed himself
of the laws of Texas.45 The record reflects that Lewis had extensive con-
tacts, which he voluntarily made with the forum. For the court of ap-
peals' analysis, these contacts began because of Lewis's involvement in
developing the California property and culminated with the contested
disbursement of ISLC's funds. Lewis was a part of several business enti-
ties, organized under Texas law and based in Texas, with Texas citizens.
Moreover, Lewis claimed entitlement to millions of dollars from promis-
sory notes made payable to his order by ISLC. Importantly, as the court
of appeals noted, at least one of those promissory notes, which was gov-
erned by Texas law, was executed by ISLC and made payable in Dallas,
Texas, in the principal amount of $2.2 million to its payees, including
Lewis. 4
6
In addition, the court of appeals observed that over a period of five
years, Lewis traveled to Texas at least five times to negotiate and manage
his Texas-based business interests involved in the underlying suit, and he
communicated extensively regarding those interests in writing, electroni-
cally, and by telephone with his Texas business associates.47 The court of
appeals also addressed Lewis's argument that his contacts were not in his
individual capacity and, therefore, might not be used as a basis for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction (i.e., the fiduciary-shield doctrine). 48 The
court of appeals, however, held that the Texas Supreme Court had never
specifically recognized the fiduciary-shield doctrine and that Texas Court
of Appeals had applied the doctrine only on questions of whether general
jurisdiction existed over nonresidents.49 "Further, corporate officers are
not shielded from the exercise of specific jurisdiction for fraudulent or
tortious acts for which they may be liable."'50 Thus, the court of appeals
could not conclude that Lewis's contacts with Texas did not include those
made in his individual capacity. 51
Finally, the court of appeals held that based on the quality, nature, and
extent of Lewis's activity in Texas, he should expect to be called into
Texas courts.5 2 As such, the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Lewis by
a Texas court did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan-
44. Id. at 914 (citing Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 790).
45. Id. at 918.
46. Id. at 916.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 916-17.
49. Id. at 917 (citing Siskind v. Villa Found. For Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex.
1982); Morris v. Kohls-York, 164 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. dism'd); SITQ
E.U., Inc. v. Reata Rests., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 638, 651 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet.
denied)).
50. Lewis, 175 S.W.3d at 917 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984); SITQ,
111 S.W.3d at 651; Tuscano v. Osterberg, 82 S.W.3d 457, 467-68 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002,
no pet.)).
51. Lewis, 175 S.W.3d at 917.
52. Id. at 918.
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tial justice. Accordingly, the trial court's implied findings were legally
and factually sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over Lewis. 53
In Hanson Pipe & Products, Inc. v. Bridge Technologies, LLC,54 the
Fifth Circuit confirmed its long-standing rule that jurisdiction must be
sufficient to establish general or specific jurisdiction over a particular en-
tity, not its affiliates. In Hanson Pipe, the licensee Hanson Pipe & Prod-
ucts sued its licensor Con/Span Bridge Systems, Ltd., and its subsidiary
Bridge Tek, claiming that they were interfering with Hanson Pipe's con-
tracts with customers. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas dismissed the suit against Con/Span for lack of personal
jurisdiction, since its contacts with Texas were insufficient to support gen-
eral jurisdiction.55
The Fifth Circuit agreed that Bridge Tek's contacts with Texas could
not support general jurisdiction over Con/Span where there was no show-
ing that Bridge Tek was Con/Span's alter ego. 56 The Fifth Circuit held
that Con/Span's website and other incidental contacts with the state of
Texas were insufficient to subject Con/Span to the general jurisdiction of
Texas courts.57
Franchise litigants sometimes resolve their dispute within a short time
after commencement of the lawsuit. When this occurs, the court may be
left to decide that it no longer has jurisdiction over the dispute. In
Kothari v. Motiva Enterprises, LLC,58 Virendra Kothari, a Shell fran-
chisee, sued Motiva Enterprises for violations of the Petroleum Market-
ing Practices Act ("PMPA"), the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA"), fraud, and breach of contract. Kothari also brought a request
for declaratory relief. All of Kothari's claims arose out of a franchise
agreement to operate a Shell service station.
In 2004, Kothari renewed his agreements with Motiva by executing a
new Retail Facility Lease and Sales Agreement. In the spring of 2004,
Kothari protested the real estate value of his service station pursuant to
the Retail Facility Lease, which formed the basis for determining the rent
to be paid. Shortly thereafter, Kothari received notice that his station
failed Motiva's image inspection. Motiva conducted two additional in-
spections, but the parties disagreed on the results of these inspections.
Kothari argued that he passed the second inspection but failed the next.
Conversely, Motiva argued that Kothari failed the next two inspections.
Nevertheless, in November 2004, Motiva sent a formal termination notice
to Kothari. Kothari subsequently filed suit.
In February 2005, the district court entered an Agreed Temporary Re-
straining Order, preserving the status quo pending resolution on the mer-
its. Also, in February 2005, the parties followed with an Agreed
53. Id. at 919.
54. 160 F. App'x 380 (5th Cir. 2005).
55. Id. at 381.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. No. H-05-0499, 2006 WL 2129097 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2006).
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Preliminary Injunction, entered by the court, which continued the status
quo through the trial. In the spring and summer of 2005, Motiva decided
to change its program to rescind termination for program violations, pro-
vided that the franchisee attended image training and pass two additional
inspections by a third party. Motiva offered to rescind Kothari's notice of
termination if he complied with these provisions. Kothari complied, and
Motiva rescinded his termination notice. At no time had Kothari's opera-
tion of his station been interrupted by Motiva. Moreover, since his re-
training, Kothari had passed all subsequent inspections and was in no
danger of terminations on the basis of inspections, which were the subject
of the lawsuit. 59
Motiva moved for summary judgment, arguing that under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because Kothari's claims were moot. The district court agreed with Mo-
tiva and dismissed Kothari's PMPA claim. 60 At the time the action was
filed, Kothari sought injunctive relief to prevent his service station from
being shut down, since he was in danger of being terminated. Since that
time, however, the district court noted that Motiva had rescinded the ter-
mination notice. Kothari argued that his request for permanent injunc-
tive relief was not moot because Motiva continued to operate a
discriminatory dual system of inspections that subjected Kothari to dan-
ger of termination. The district court disagreed, finding that a yet-unreal-
ized, purely speculative danger of termination was insufficient to obtain
PMPA injunctive relief.61 As such, the district court held that Kothari's
franchise was never terminated and was not subject to cancellation, and
Kothari could not maintain a PMPA action. 62 The district court also de-
nied Motiva's motion for summary judgment on Kothari's state-law
claim, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. 63
B. CHOICE OF LAW
Choice-of-law provisions have played a part in establishing jurisdiction
over a party. In Marathon Metallic Building Co., L.P. v. A&H Supply,
Inc.,64 a Colorado company, Mountain Empire, distributed in Colorado
the products of Marathon, a Texas corporation. A Mountain Empire
principal and two associates entered into a broad guaranty of Mountain
Empire's obligations to Marathon. Soon after the guaranty was sent to
Texas, the parties memorialized their business relationship in a contract
that contained a Texas choice-of-law clause. Mountain Empire failed to
pay its debts to Marathon, and Marathon sued Mountain Empire and an
59. Id. at *2.
60. Id. at *4-5.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *4.
63. Id. at *5.
64. Id. at *3 (quoting Goodman Co., L.P. v. A&H Supply, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 766,
771-72 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Marathon Metallic Bldg. Co. v. Mountain Empire Constr.
Co., 653 F.2d 926, 923 (5th Cir. 1981))).
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individual guarantor in Texas. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the choice-of-law clause contained in the general contract between
the parties involved "purposeful and affirmative action, resulting in, at
least, a minimum contact with Texas by the guarantor. '65
In NE Corp. v. Fish,66 NE Corporation sued Scott Fish, among others,
for breach of contract, alleging that Fish, as the guarantor, failed to pay
certain monies due under a promissory note once it matured. Fish filed
several motions challenging personal jurisdiction, since Fish was a resi-
dent of Tennessee and did not conduct business in Texas. Fish also ar-
gued that jurisdiction may be proper in Colorado (i.e., the situs of the
property made the basis of the underlying sale). The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas evaluated Fish's contacts
with Texas to determine whether personal jurisdiction existed.6 7
The district court found that personal jurisdiction over Fish for the
breach of contract claim was appropriate. The district court observed
that the guaranty, which he executed for the promissory note, specifically
stated that it would be "governed by and construed and enforced in ac-
cordance with the laws of the State of Texas."'6 8 While the district court
noted that "the presence of a choice-of-law clause in a contract would not
alone support personal jurisdiction in an action based on that contract, '6 9
the district court held that the guaranty at issue was of an expansive, ab-
solute, and continuing type.70
The language of the guaranty provided that "Guarantor hereby abso-
lutely and unconditionally guarantees the prompt, complete, and full pay-
ment when due. . ."; "[t]his Guaranty is an irrevocable, absolute,
continuing guaranty of payment .... ",71 The district court found that this
broad guaranty, together with the Texas choice-of-law provision embod-
ied within it, supported personal jurisdiction over NE's breach of contract
claim.72
Choice-of-law provisions, however, may not apply to all claims. In Red
Roof Inns, Inc. v. Murat Holdings,7 3 Murat Holdings, LLC sued Red
Roof Inns, Inc. and Accor Economy Lodging, Inc. (collectively, "Red
65. NE Corp. v. Fish, No. Civ.A. 3:05 CV 1525-B, 2006 WL 196951, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
2006) (citing Marathon, 653 F.2d 922-23). Other district courts in the Fifth Circuit were
noted for having found personal jurisdiction to exist where expansive guarantees are
paired with a choice of law clause. See, e.g., Plainscapital Bank v. Malina, No. Civ.A. 3:05-
CV-0469, 2005 WL 3454017, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2005); Goodman Co., L.P. v. A & H
Supply, Inc., 396 F.Supp.2d 766, 771 (S.D. Tex 2005).
66. No. Civ.A. 3:05CV1525-B, 2006 WL 196951 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2006).
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *3.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *4.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Murat Holdings, LLC, 223 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2007, pet. filed). The first appellate opinion was withdrawn and superseded. See Red Roof
Inns, Inc. v. Murat Holdings, LLC, No. 05-05-00240-CV, 2006 WL 2458563 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2006, opinion superseded).
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Roof"). Murat alleged contract, statutory, and tort claims. Red Roof
moved for summary judgment on all claims. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment against Murat on the statutory and tort claims. The con-
tract claims were tried to a jury. The trial court rendered judgment on
the jury verdict in the amount of $5,806,000.00 plus prejudgment interest,
court costs, and attorney's fees in favor of Murat. Both Murat and Red
Roof appealed.
A few background facts are relevant. In 1998, Murat entered into a
franchise agreement with Red Roof Inns and commenced renovations at
the hotel. The following year, Accor acquired Red Roof Inns and later
decided that (1) it would abandon the Red Roof Inn & Suites concept,
and (2) it did not want Murat's hotel in the Red Roof system. Red Roof
offered to terminate the franchise agreement, but Murat refused. Al-
though Murat continued renovations at the hotel, disputes arose regard-
ing whether Murat's renovations were sufficient for opening. This lawsuit
followed with Murat asserting contract, statutory and tort claims against
Red Roof.
Red Roof moved for summary judgment on Murat's statutory and tort
claims. The trial court granted summary judgment against Murat, and
Murat contended that the trial court erred on its claims for: (1) tortious
interference; (2) violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act
("LUTPA"); (3) fraud and negligent misrepresentation; and (4) breach of
fiduciary duty.
The franchise agreement contained a choice-of-law provision, which
provided that it would "be interpreted, construed and enforced in accor-
dance with the internal substantive laws of the State of Ohio, without
regard to conflicts of laws principles. '74 The court of appeals held that by
its language, the choice of Ohio law was limited to the interpretation and
enforcement of the franchise agreement.7 5 Therefore, Ohio law did not
necessarily govern Murat's statutory and tort claims. 76
The court of appeals noted that Texas courts use the "most significant
relationship" test to decide choice of law issues. Under that test, a court
must consider which state's law has the most significant relationship "'to
the particular substantive issue to be resolved." 77 Moreover, the appel-
late court set out the Restatement's general principals relevant in a
choice of law analysis:
(a) The needs of the interstate and international systems;
(b) The relevant policies of the forum;
(c) The relevant policies of the other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in determination of the particular issue;
(d) The protection of justified expectations;
(e) The basic policies underlying the particular field of law;
74. Id. at 684.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tex. 2000)).
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(f) Certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and
(g) Ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.78
The court of appeals noted that these contacts were to be evaluated ac-
cording to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
Instead of the number of contacts being determinative, a court must eval-
uate the contacts in light of the state policies underlying the particular
substantive issue. 79
The court of appeals commented that the choice of law was relevant to
Murat's claims for tortious interference, LUTPA violation, fraud/negli-
gent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. The court of ap-
peals concluded that Louisiana had the most significant relationship to
the parties and the dispute.8 0 The Murat's hotel was located in Louisiana.
The franchise agreement was signed in Ohio and Murat paid the initial
franchise fee in Ohio. Murat's alleged damages flowed from expendi-
tures it incurred in renovating the hotel and profits it lost when not al-
lowed to open as a Red Roof Inn. Murat was a Louisiana limited liability
company whose principal office was located in Florida. Appearing to be
most significant, the court of appeals found that Murat's performance
under the franchise agreement occurred primarily in Louisiana. Many of
the alleged misrepresentations by Red Roof occurred in Louisiana. As
such, the court of appeals found that Louisiana had a "greater stake in
the outcome than Ohio."'8 1 Furthermore, "the purpose of Louisiana's un-
fair trade and consumer protection act is to protect consumers in its state
and to deter injury to competition. '82
Applying Louisiana law, the court of appeals held that the summary
judgment evidence was sufficient to raise a fact issue on Murat's tortious
interference claim.83 The court of appeals held that Murat failed to file
its LUTPA claim within the one year statute of limitations period so the
trial court properly granted summary judgment on that claim. 84 The
court of appeals also concluded that the trial court properly granted sum-
mary judgment on Murat's fraud/negligent misrepresentation and breach
of fiduciary duty claims.85 Because the trial court committed a reversible
error on the jury charge regarding the oral modification instruction for
the breach of contract claim, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's judgment and remanded this case for a new trial.86
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
79. Murat Holdings, 223 S.W.3d at 685.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 685.
83. Id. at 687.
84. Id. at 689.
85. Id. at 690.
86. Id. at 683, 690.
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C. FORUM SELECTION
In Youngblood v. JTH Tax Services, Inc.,8 7 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas affirmed the concept that forum-
selection clauses in franchise agreements should be enforced. The plain-
tiff William Youngblood opened a Liberty Tax Service franchise in San
Antonio in January 2006. After the franchise closed its doors in March
2006, Youngblood filed a lawsuit in state court against JTH Tax for fraud-
ulent inducement, DTPA violations, and negligent misrepresentation.
JTH Tax removed the case and filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alter-
native, a motion to transfer venue. JTH Tax argued that the franchise
agreement contained an exclusive mandatory forum-selection clause
designating Virginia as the proper forum.88 Youngblood argued that this
lawsuit should be abated pending determination of a Virginia court's de-
cision, involving the same parties and issues.89 Although the district
court denied JTH Tax's motion to dismiss, the district court granted its
motion to transfer venue. 90
First, the district court analyzed whether the forum-selection clause ap-
plied to Youngblood's claims. The franchise agreement contained a para-
graph entitled "Jurisdiction and Venue," providing:
[i]n any suit brought against us, including our present and former
employees and agents, which in any way relates to or arises out of
this Agreement, or any of the dealings of the parties hereto, venue
shall be proper only in the federal court located nearest our National
Office (presently the U.S. District in Norfolk, Virginia), or if neither
federal subject matter or diversity jurisdiction exists, in the city or
county state court located where our National Office is (presently
the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia.). 91
The district court held that because the forum-selection clause included
language such as "venue shall be proper only," the forum-selection clause
was "exclusive and mandatory. '92
Second, the district court determined whether the clause should be en-
forced. The district court determined that, based on federal law, the fo-
rum-selection clause was enforceable because Youngblood had "not
established that it was included in the franchise agreement as a product of
fraud or overreaching or that its enforcement would be otherwise
unreasonable. 1193
87. No. SA: 06-CA-380-XR, 2006 WL 1984656 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006). Co-Author
Deborah S. Coldwell served as lead counsel for JTH Tax Services, Inc. in this matter.
88. Id. at *1.
89. About a month after Youngblood filed suit, JTH Tax filed a separate suit against
Youngblood in the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting a claim for breach of the franchise
agreement. JTH Tax, Inc. v. William Youngblood & South Texas Finance, Inc., No. 2:06-
CV-00256-JBF-FBS (E.D. Va.).
90. JTH Tax, 2006 WL 1984656, at *6.
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The district court next analyzed JTH Tax's motion to dismiss. 94 The
district court noted that the Fifth Circuit has held that a motion pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(3) is a proper method for seeking dismissal based on a
forum-selection clause. 95 However, the Fifth Circuit has not considered
the application of Rule 12(b)(3) in a case in which the forum-selection
clause designated another federal forum rather than a state court or for-
eign jurisdiction. 96 Thus, because JTH Tax moved both to dismiss and to
transfer, and because the district court concluded that a transfer was in
the interest of justice, the district court denied JTH Tax's motion to
dismiss. 9
7
In evaluating JTH Tax's motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), the district court first concluded that this suit could have been
brought in the transferee district (i.e., the Eastern District of Virginia). 98
The district court next examined the § 1404(a) factors. The private con-
cerns include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the
availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses;
(3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
The public concerns include: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing
from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests
decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will
govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems with con-
flict of laws of the application of foreign law.99
After analyzing convenience to the parties and witnesses as well as
sources of proof, the district court held that the private factors did not
necessarily militate in favor of venue in either Virginia or Texas. 100 The
district court, however, held that the public factors weighed in favor of
transfer. 10 1 The trial would be more expedient in Virginia; the Virginia
court would be better equipped to try the case because Virginia law gov-
erned the case; and Virginia had an interest in suits against its residents
and their alleged fraudulent conduct. 10 2 The district court concluded that
JTH Tax's numerous franchisees benefit from the savings and certainty
inherent in the forum-selection clause and its enforcement. 10 3
Finally, the district court pointed out that the mandatory forum-selec-
tion clause weighed strongly in favor of a transfer.'04 The district court
94. Id. (noting that JTH Tax moved to dismissed under Rule 12(b)( 3) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a)).
95. Id. at *3 (citing Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902 (5th
Cir. 2005)).
96. JTH Tax, 2006 WL 1984656, at *2.
97. Id. at *3.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at *5.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *6.
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stated that although Youngblood "knew of the potential inconvenience of
litigating in Virginia and was aware of his health issues at the time he
signed the agreement, he voluntarily consented to the designation of a
Virginia forum. '' 105 As such, the district court granted JTH Tax's motion
to transfer and ordered that the action be transferred to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. 0 6
Forum-selection clauses may also be enforced to determine the particu-
lar district of the state in which litigation will take place. For example, in
In re Talent Tree Crystal,107 Talent Tree filed a petition for writ of manda-
mus and an application for temporary relief with the Houston Court of
Appeals for the First District. Talent Tree complained that the trial court
improperly refused to enforce the forum-selection clause in the franchise
agreement. 08
In the underlying suit, DRG, Inc., sued Talent Tree, among other
claims, for breach of contract arising from a renewed franchise agree-
ment. The franchise agreement contained a forum selection clause speci-
fying venue:
Any cause of action between [Talent Tree] and [DRG] arising under
this Agreement will be brought in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas. If that Court lacks jurisdiction,
the action will be brought in the state courts in Houston, Texas, and
[DRG] submits to the jurisdiction of such courts. No rights or causes
of action arising from this Agreement will be lost if these venues are
not available.10 9
Despite this venue provision, DRG sued Talent Tree in a Texas state
court. Talent Tree repeatedly moved to dismiss the original and amended
petitions based on the forum-selection clauses. The trial court denied
Talent Tree's motion, and Talent Tree sought mandamus relief.110
The court of appeals first recited its well-settled rule that a motion to
dismiss, by which Talent Tree sought to enforce the forum-selection
clause, was the correct procedural mechanism to enforce a forum-selec-
tion clause." The court of appeals noted that "a trial court must enforce
a forum selection clause unless the opposing party clearly demonstrates
that (1) enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust or (2) the clause
is invalid for such reasons such as fraud or overreaching."'112
The court of appeals held that DRG did not show that the contract was
invalid, since it did not assert any fraud or overreaching of the franchise
agreement. 113 The court of appeals rejected DRG's contention that the
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. In re Talent Tree Crystal, No. 01-05-00686-CV, 2006 WL 305015 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 9, 2006, no pet.).
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *3.
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clause in the franchise agreement was not a forum-selection clause, but,
rather, a contractual venue provision.1 1 4 The court of appeals held that
there was no issue of dominant jurisdiction, which only existed when
venue is proper in two or more Texas counties. 1 5 Furthermore, the court
of appeals held that DRG did not show that enforcement was unreasona-
ble or unjust, nor did it show any grave difficulty or inconvenience with
trying the case in the Southern District of Texas. 116 Finally, the court of
appeals rejected DRG's argument that laches applied to preclude manda-
mus relief. As a result, the court of appeals conditionally granted Talent
Tree's petition for a writ of mandamus.11 7
Franchisees and licensees have also challenged whether an agreement's
forum-selection clause applies to pre-contractual claims. In Clark v.
Power Marketing Direct, Inc.,118 two licensees, James Clark and Ricky
Pagnozzi, filed a suit against Power Marketing Direct, Inc., in Harris
County, Texas, asserting claims for fraudulent inducement, fraud, and vi-
olation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Each license agree-
ment, however, contained a forum-selection clause designating Ohio as
the proper venue. Clark's license agreement provided that:
[A]ny action, claim or demand arising under or as a result of this
Agreement shall be filed in Franklin County, Ohio and [Clark]
hereby agrees and consents to the jurisdiction of any court located in
Franklin County, Ohio. 119
On the other hand, Pagnozzi's license agreement provided that:
[A]ny action, claim or demand arising under or as a result of this
Agreement shall be filed in the common Pleas Court of Franklin
County, Ohio, and [Pagnozzi] hereby agrees and consents to the ju-
risdiction of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas as to any
dispute involving the parties' business relationship, including per-
sonal jurisdiction over [Pagnozzi] and subject matter jurisdiction
over the dispute.12 0
Power Marketing moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted its motion.
Clark and Pagnozzi appealed, arguing that the forum-selection clause
must be construed "most strictly" against Power Marketing, the drafter of
the license agreement. The Houston Court of Appeals disagreed and
held that a contract is interpreted against the drafter only when it is de-
termined to be ambiguous.1 21 Since neither party identified any ambigu-
ity and because a contract is interpreted against the drafter only as a last
resort, the court of appeals overruled Clark and Pagnozzi's first point of
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *34,
117. Id. at *4.
118. 192 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet. h.).
119. Id. at 797.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 798.
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error.122
Similarly, the court of appeals rejected Clark and Pagnozzi's argument
that the forum-selection clause did not apply, since their causes of action
involved pre-contractual tort claims. 12 3 The court of appeals noted the
Texas Supreme Court's holding in Haase v. Glazner:124 "in the absence of
a contract, a plaintiff cannot assert a fraudulent inducement claim." 12 5
The court of appeals further noted that the Dallas Court of Appeals and
the Texas federal courts had expressly rejected the argument that a fo-
rum-selection clause could not encompass pre-contractual tort claims.1 26
The court of appeals held that a forum-selection clause can encompass
claims of fraud in the inducement.12 7 The court of appeals further held
that the "forum selection clauses were drafted broadly enough to encom-
pass all of Clark and Pagnozzi's claims."128
The court of appeals also rejected Clark and Pagnozzi's argument that
because a successful suit would result in the contracts being ruled void,
the forum-selection clauses should not be enforced.129 Since Texas law
presumes contracts to be valid, the court of appeals held that it would not
"inquire into the enforceability of the contract in which that clause was
found," and upheld enforcement of the forum-selection clause. 130
D. ARBITRATION
As discussed earlier, in Hanson Pipe, the Fifth Circuit dismissed a li-
censee's suit against its licensor and ordered the licensee and the licen-
sor's subsidiary to arbitration.131 The Fifth Circuit held that, "[a]lthough
the contract containing the arbitration claim was between Con/Span (the
licensor) and Hanson Pipe, Hanson Pipe did not challenge in the district
court its obligation to arbitrate its claim on grounds that Bridge Tek (the
subsidiary) was not a signator to the agreement."1 32 The Fifth Circuit
refused to consider any argument made for the first time on appeal. 133
In addition, the Fifth Circuit held that, although the contract containing
the arbitration clause expired before the dispute arose that was the sub-
122. Id.
123. Id. at 799-800.
124. 62 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2001).
125. Clark, 192 S.W.3d at 799 (quoting id. at 798 (noting that fraudulent inducement "is
a particular species of fraud that arises only in the context of a contract and requires the
existence of a contract as a part of its proof.")).
126. Clark, 192 S.W.3d at 799 (citing My Cafd-CCC, Ltd. v. Lunchstop, Inc., 107 S.W.3d
860, 867 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet. h.) abrogated on other grounds by In re AIU Ins.
Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004)); see also Tex. Source Group, Inc. v. CCH, Inc., 967 F.
Supp. 234, 237-38 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 547
(N.D. Tex. 1982).
127. Clark, 192 S.W.3d at 800.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Hanson Pipe & Products, Inc. v. Bridge Tech., LLC, 160 F. App'x 380, 382 (5th Cir.
2005).
132. Id.
133. Id.
1098 [Vol. 60
Franchise Law
ject of the suit, the Supreme Court has made it clear that an arbitration
clause applies to a grievance arising after the expiration of the agreement
when "under normal principles of contract interpretation, the disputed
contractual right survives expiration of the remainder of the agree-
ment. '134 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that defendants
were entitled to demand arbitration because plaintiff sought a ruling re-
garding the scope and legitimacy of the intellectual property rights de-
fendants claimed to possess in their bridge system that survived the
expiration of the contract. 135 As such, the district court properly submit-
ted this dispute to arbitration. 136
When parties agree to arbitrate and the arbitrator's decision is con-
firmed, appellate review is very limited, since decisions are meant to be
final in all but exceptional cases. In Universal Computer Systems, Inc. v.
Dealer Solutions, LLC,137 the Houston Court of Appeals held that the
facts presented were not exceptional under the applicable case law, and,
therefore, confirmation of the arbitrator's decision was confirmed.1 38 In
this case, Universal Computer Systems, among others, sued its competi-
tor Dealer Solutions, among others, for misappropriation of trade secrets
and breach of the licensing agreement. Dealer Solutions counterclaimed
for misappropriation of trade secrets.1 39
In the trial court, Dealer Solutions and Universal were engaged in a
highly contested discovery dispute. Dealer Solutions propounded inter-
rogatories to Universal requesting the identity of each trade secret that
Dealer Solutions allegedly misappropriated, and Dealer Solutions alleged
Universal provided inadequate responses on more than five occasions.
Dealer Solutions repeatedly moved to compel the identity of each trade
secret. After three sets of supplemental responses to the interrogatories,
which Dealer Solutions still contended were inadequate, Universal filed a
proposed order, which was agreed to by Dealer Solutions, referring the
case to arbitration. The trial court, nevertheless, entertained the discov-
ery dispute by entering an order granting Dealer Solutions' motion to
dismiss for discovery abuse. Pursuant to the order, the trial court "estab-
lished a presumption of the non-existence of any trade secret ... claimed
by [Universal] .... ,,140 Although Universal again supplemented its dis-
covery responses, Dealer Solutions filed a second motion to dismiss for
discovery abuse. Although the trial court denied the second motion to
dismiss, it limited Universal's evidence in support of its claim that a cer-
tain software system was a trade secret. Following this order, Universal
again moved to compel arbitration, the trial court held a hearing to clarify
the evidentiary limitation, and the trial court granted, in part, Universal's
134. Id. (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1991)).
135. Hanson Pipe, 160 F. App'x at 382.
136. Id.
137. 183 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
138. Id. at 744.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 746.
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motion to compel arbitration. Universal filed a mandamus petition, chal-
lenging the trial court's partial denial of its motion to compel
arbitration.1 41
In the arbitration, despite the trial court's "discovery-limitation" ruling,
the panel of three arbitrators declined to limit Universal's testimony and
evidence on trade secrets. As such, the panel allowed Universal to intro-
duce evidence for two weeks. After hearing all the evidence, the panel
held that Universal had failed to prove its trade secret misappropriation
claim.142
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred by not sending the
case immediately to arbitration and in making the "discovery-limitation"
ruling.143 "Once a party seeking to compel arbitration establishes that an
agreement [to arbitrate] exists . . ., and that the claims raised are within
the agreement's scope, the trial court has no discretion but to compel
arbitration and stay its proceedings pending arbitration."'1 44 However,
notwithstanding the trial court's order, the arbitrators ultimately consid-
ered all of Universal's evidence, not just the matters set forth in Univer-
sal's interrogatory responses. The court of appeals, therefore, held that
the trial court's discovery order did not cause the rendition of an im-
proper judgment. 145
After reviewing the circumstances of the arbitration award, the court of
appeals held that Universal did not establish sufficient grounds to set
aside the award, namely, that the decision was tainted with fraud, miscon-
duct, or gross mistake. 146 Along with other arguments that Universal
made, Universal asserted that the panel made a gross mistake by failing
to address three leading Texas cases and making legal conclusions that
were a "gross distortion of well-settled law."'1 47 The court of appeals con-
cluded that "these alleged errors in the application of substantive law by
the arbitrators during the proceedings were not reviewable by the court
on a motion to vacate an award.' 48 The court of appeals emphasized
that it "could not review alleged errors in the application of substantive
law by the arbitrators.' 149 Rather, its review was confined to whether the
record indicated the arbitrators acted in bad faith or failed to exercise
honest judgment-not whether it agreed or disagreed with the panel's
application of the law. 150 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded
that the arbitrators did not commit a gross mistake in finding that Univer-
sal failed to prove its trade secret misappropriation and breach of con-
141. Id. at 747.
142. Id. at 748.
143. Id. at 749-50.
144. Id. at 749.
145. Id. at 750.
146. Id. at 753-54.
147. Id. at 751.
148. Id. at 753.
149. Id. at 754.
150. Id.
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tract claims.151
IV. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION,
AND NON-RENEWAL
A. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
In Douglas v. Petroleum Wholesale, Inc.,152 the Houston Court of Ap-
peals heard an appeal from the trial court's ruling that an operator of a
Diamond Shamrock gas station was not a franchisee/retailer under the
PMPAI 53 and, therefore, could not avail itself of the protections afforded
by the PMPA.15 4 Defendant Petroleum Wholesale, Inc., ("PWI") was a
wholesale distributor of motor fuel, who had contracted with the owner
of a gas station and convenience store to supply Diamond Shamrock
branded motor fuel on assignment in connection with related Diamond
Shamrock signage and materials. The gas station owner leased, and then
ultimately sold, the assets related to the gas station and convenience store
to Douglas in 1997, and Douglas continued to operate under the Dia-
mond Shamrock name. PWI continued to perform under the existing
agreement after Douglas took ownership of the assets. However, in 2000,
PWI informed Douglas that his station was being "de-branded" and that
he could no longer sell Diamond Shamrock branded motor fuel. 55
Douglas sued PWI for wrongful termination of their alleged franchise
relationship on grounds that the termination violated the PMPA. Doug-
las argued that he was a retailer under the PMPA who purchased motor
fuel for sale to the general public. However, the trial court found that
Douglas obtained gas from PWI on consignment and therefore never
purchased fuel for sale to the general public, which was a requirement for
application of the PMPA. Therefore, the trial court found that Douglas
could not avail himself of the protections of the PMPA1 56
On appeal, Douglas argued that he met the definition of a retailer be-
cause he satisfied a test that analyzes whether the party has a "significant
indicia of entrepreneurial responsibility or economic risk in the operation
of the motor fuel sales at his store." 157 The significant-indicia-of-en-
trepreneurial-responsibility test has been used in a number of cases. It
instructs courts to first look to the statutory definition of a retailer and
then to the totality of the circumstances to see whether the operator ef-
fectively undertakes the risks associated with the resale of fuel.158 How-
ever, the court of appeals declined to go beyond the clear language of the
PMPA and instead stated that it believed the "the indicia of en-
151. Id.
152. 190 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
153. 15 U.S.C. §2801-06.
154. Douglas, 190 S.W.3d at 98.
155. Id. at 97.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 100-01.
158. Id. at 101.
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trepreneurial responsibility to be relevant only to the extent that it estab-
lishes that a gas station operator purchases motor fuel for resale to the
public."' 159 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
that Douglas was not a retailer under the PMPA. 160
B. TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL
In Kothari v. Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C.,161 Kothari brought an action
against Motiva stemming from the termination of a franchise agreement
to operate a Shell service station. Kothari operated a Shell branded ser-
vice station in Houston, Texas, pursuant to two contracts: a Retail Facility
Lease and a Retail Sales Agreement. After protesting the real estate
value of his station pursuant to the Retail Facility Lease (for purposes of
calculating rent), Kothari received notice that his station failed an image
inspection conducted pursuant to the Retail Sales Agreement. Thereaf-
ter, Motiva issued a formal notice of termination to take effect on Febru-
ary 21, 2005. Before the termination was effective, Kothari filed suit
alleging that Motiva's Notice of Termination violated the PMPA and also
asserting causes of action under the DTPA, common law fraud, breach of
contract, and a cause of action for declaratory judgment. The court en-
tered an Agreed Temporary Restraining Order preserving the status quo
pending resolution on the merits. In the interim period, Motiva devel-
oped and promoted a rescission program for former franchisees that had
previously been terminated due to imaging defaults. The rescission pro-
gram required the terminated franchisee to attend image training and
pass two additional inspections by a third party in order to be eligible for
rescission. Motiva offered rescission to Kothari, and Kothari accepted. 162
Since Kothari's termination was rescinded and Kothari had never actu-
ally ceased operating, Motiva moved to dismiss Kothari's PMPA claims as
moot, moved for summary judgment on Kothari's remaining fraud,
DTPA, and part of its breach of contract claims, and moved for dismissal
of Kothari's declaratory relief action. As to the PMPA claims, the district
court held that the Temporary Restraining Order and the damages claims
were indeed moot. 163 The district court also found that the declaratory
relief claims were not justiciable. 164 However, the district court declined
to grant the motion for summary judgment as it pertained to the state law
fraud, DTPA, and breach of contract claims, finding that the factors
weighed against exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 165 Instead, the dis-
trict court dismissed the claims without prejudice such that Kothari could
bring the claims in state court if desired. 166
159. Id. at 102.
160. Id.
161. No. H-05-0499, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55800 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
162. Id. at *2.
163. Id. at *12-13.
164. Id. at *20.
165. Id. at *18-19.
166. Id. at *19, 21.
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V. COMMON-LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACT ISSUES
In Performance Dealerships, L.P. v. Mitsubishi Motors North America,
Inc.,167 the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
addressed an automobile-dealership franchisee's claims of fraud, eco-
nomic duress, and unconscionability against its franchisor. In 2003, the
automobile dealership entered into a sales and services agreement with
Mitsubishi. In 2004, after suffering financial loss, the dealership sought
permission from Mitsubishi to house its Saab service and parts depart-
ment, which was precluded by the terms of the 2003 agreement. Mitsub-
ishi, however, agreed to enter into a new sales and service agreement in
2004 that would allow the dealership to combine its Saab and Mitsubishi
operations for a period of twenty-four months. As in the 2003 agree-
ment, the 2004 agreement contained a general release and a waiver of the
application of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code, which provides
certain protections to parties executing releases, thus allowing the dealer-
ship to release unknown claims. Two months after entering into the new
agreement, the dealership resigned as an authorized Mitsubishi dealer
and sued Mitsubishi alleging fraud, economic duress, and
unconscionability.168
To establish fraud under California law, 169 a plaintiff must show (1) a
misrepresentation; (2) knowledge that the misrepresentation was false;
(3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.170
The principal of the automobile dealership alleged that a Mitsubishi em-
ployee told him that the terms of the 2004 agreement were the same as
the terms of the 2003 agreement. A comparison of the two agreements
revealed that the agreements were in fact identical other than the addi-
tion of an exhibit that allowed the plaintiff to operate the Saab dealership
on the premises. Therefore, the district court held that the dealership
failed to present evidence that Mitsubishi made any misrepresentations
regarding the release.17 1 Further, the district court held that the principal
of the automobile dealership was not justified in relying on the alleged
misrepresentation under the circumstances. 1 72 Where a party on one side
of the transaction is represented by counsel, he cannot justifiably rely on
the alleged misrepresentations made by an individual on the other side of
the transaction. 173 The district court granted Mitsubishi's motion for
summary judgment with regard to the fraud claim. 174
167. No. Civ.A. H-05-4211, 2006 WL 964730 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2006).
168. Id. at *1.
169. The 2004 Sales and Service Agreement provided that it "shall be governed by, and
construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of California." Id. at *3.
170. Id. at *4 (citing Gil v. Bank of Am., 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
171. Mitsubishi Motors, 2006 WL 964730, at *4.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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The district court also granted Mitsubishi's summary judgment motion
on the economic duress claim. A release may be held invalid on the basis
of economic duress if a party is subject to a wrongful act and succumbs to
the wrongdoer to avoid financial ruin. 75 The district court held that
plaintiff failed to present evidence that Mitsubishi had threatened or en-
gaged in any related misconduct, particularly where Mitsubishi had
agreed to renegotiate the 2003 agreement to allow the dealership to
house portions of its Saab operation with portions of the Mitsubishi busi-
ness. 176 Additionally, the district court recognized that there was no evi-
dence that plaintiff would have faced economic ruin.1 77
Finally, the district court granted summary judgment on the unconscio-
nability claim. Under California law, a court may invalidate a release if it
is unconscionable both procedurally, where the circumstances show op-
pression and surprise, and substantively, where the terms of the release
are overly-harsh and one-sided. 178 Because the principal of the automo-
bile dealership was a well-educated businessman with years of experience
in the automobile industry, was represented by counsel at all relevant
times, and the release language was not hidden in the 2004 agreement,
the district court held that there was no evidence that the release was
procedurally unconscionable.' 79 Further, the release language was
straight-forward, clear and not overly harsh, and, therefore, the district
court held that it was not substantively unconscionable.18 0
In Murat Holdings,'8 ' the breach of contract claim was tried to a jury
and the trial court rendered judgment on the jury verdict in the amount
of $5,806,000 in favor of Murat. The question of whether the parties
modified the franchise agreement was not submitted to the jury even
though the jury received an instruction on contract modification. The
court of appeals held that Murat had to establish modification of the
franchise agreement first in order to prove that Murat satisfied its obliga-
tions and to support a breach by Red Roof. 82 The court of appeals con-
cluded that it was likely that the oral modification instruction formed the
basis for the jury's findings that Murat met its obligations under the
franchise agreement and Red Roof breached the agreement. 183 How-
ever, because the court of appeals could not conclusively determine the
effect of the instruction, the court of appeals held that the trial court's
error in including the instruction without an accompanying question was
175. Id. (citing Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001)).
176. Mitsubishi Motors, 2006 WL 964730, at *4.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *5 (citing A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982)).
179. Mitsubishi Motors, 2006 WL 764730, at *5.
180. Id.
181. Murat Holdings, 223 S.W.3d at 681.
182. Id. at 682.
183. Id. at 683.
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reversible error that prevented Red Roof from presenting its case on
appeal. 184
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In Wallace v. Wymer, 185 four boys left Astroworld Amusement Park
through the front gate. Somewhere between Astroworld and a nearby
McDonald's parking lot, they were assaulted by a gang of fifty or more
unknown people. After the assault, the boys continued towards the Mc-
Donald's restaurant where they were picked up by one of the boys' par-
ents. After they left the McDonald's parking lot in the parent's car, they
were struck by another car fleeing an attack by people in the McDonald's
parking lot. Plaintiffs sued McDonald's, Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc., in
its capacity as owner of Astroworld, and others, claiming that the defend-
ants were liable for plaintiffs' personal injuries. 186
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Six Flags and
the Houston Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Six Flags did not
have a duty to protect plaintiffs from the assault. 187 The general rule is
that "no person has a legal duty to protect another from the criminal acts
of a third person."'188 An exception to this rule, however, exists when a
person controls the premises.189 Under these circumstances, a person
"has a duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees from criminal acts of
third parties if he knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable and
foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee." 190 Because the acts occurred
outside Astroworld, the court of appeals held that Six Flags could not
have had "knowledge of an unreasonable and foreseeable risk," and
therefore, the exception did not apply. 191
The district court also granted McDonald's motion for summary judg-
ment. McDonald's produced summary judgment evidence, including an
affidavit from a McDonald's corporate representative, stating that Mc-
Donald's did not own or control the restaurant where the alleged assault
took place, and the restaurant was instead owned by Wymer Enter-
prises. 192 Because plaintiffs failed to mention Wymer in their response to
the summary judgment motion and because there was no evidence to cre-
ate an issue of fact regarding McDonald's ownership or control of the
restaurant, the court of appeals found no error in the district court's grant
of summary judgment to McDonald's. 193
184. Id.
185. No. 01-04-00735-CV, 2005 WL 3214689 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] Dec. 1,
2005, no pet.).
186. Id. at *1.
187. Id. at *3.
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *3.
193. Id. at *34.
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VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Under the Texas Non-Compete Act,194 a covenant is enforceable if it
(a) is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement, and (b)
contains reasonable limitations on the time, geographical area, and scope
of the activity to be restrained, which do not impose a greater restraint
than necessary to protect the employer's goodwill or business interest. To
be "ancillary" to an "otherwise enforceable agreement," the considera-
tion typically consists of an employer's promise to provide an employee
confidential information, which makes the non-compete covenant neces-
sary to enforce the employee's return promise not to disclose the confi-
dential documents or materials. 195
Although not a franchise case, and slightly outside the survey period,
on October 20, 2006, the Texas Supreme Court revisited and revised its
landmark ruling in Light v. Centel Cellular Company of Texas,1 96 the sem-
inal case concerning covenants not to compete in Texas. Thus, we felt it
necessary to include the case in this Survey, since it could have a bearing
on franchises in Texas.
In Alex Sheshunoff Management Services, L.P. v. Johnson,197 the Texas
Supreme Court held that an at-will employee's promise not to disclose
confidential information became an enforceable agreement to support a
non-compete covenant when his employer later performed its corre-
sponding promise to provide training and access to confidential informa-
tion.1 98 By reaching this decision, the Texas Supreme Court removed its
Light-imposed requirement that the agreement containing the covenant
had to be enforceable the instant the agreement was made.1 99
In Sheshunoff, an employer required a four-year, at-will employee, sev-
eral months after being promoted, to sign an employment agreement con-
taining a covenant not to compete. In the covenant, the employee agreed
that, for one year after his termination, he would not: (1) provide services
to any of the employer's clients to whom the employee had provided ser-
vices or conducted significant sales activity within the last year of his em-
ployment (without geographical limitation); or (2) solicit or aid any other
party in soliciting the employer's clients or prospective clients. The cove-
nant was ancillary to a confidentiality/non-disclosure agreement in which
the employer agreed to provide the employee with confidential informa-
tion and special training regarding its business methods, and, in turn, the
employee agreed not to disclose the confidential information. After the
employee signed the agreement, the employer later provided the em-
ployee with the confidential information and training on an on-going
194. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2002).
195. Sheshunoff, 209 S.W.3d at 648-49.
196. 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994).
197. 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2004).
198. Id. at 646.
199. Id.
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basis.200
Subsequently, the employee resigned and went to work for a competi-
tor, and the employer sued the employee to enforce the restrictive cove-
nant. The trial and appellate courts determined, relying on Light, that the
confidentiality/non-disclosure provision was not "an otherwise enforcea-
ble" agreement because the employer did not make a promise that was
enforceable at the time the parties entered into the agreement. The em-
ployer appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Texas. 20 1
Based on Light, a split among the Texas appellate courts developed
concerning what promises between the employer and employee are suffi-
cient to create an "otherwise enforceable agreement." The majority
viewpoint has been that the "otherwise enforceable agreement" cannot
be dependent on any future performance. Instead, the agreement must
be enforceable "at the time the agreement is made. 20 2 The Sheshunoff
case resolved this post-Light confusion.
Initially, the Texas Supreme Court agreed that, under Light, the em-
ployer's promise to provide confidential information and training was not
enforceable at the time the confidentiality/non-disclosure agreement was
made.20 3 Rather, the employer could have terminated Johnson's at-will
employment before it provided the confidential information and training,
which made the employer's promise illusory at that point in time.20 4
Under the reasoning in Light, the non-compete was unenforceable be-
cause the promise giving rise to the employer's interest in restraining the
employee from competing (providing confidential information) was not
enforceable at the time the agreement was made.205 In Sheshunoff, how-
ever, the supreme court departed from this view of Texas non-compete
law.
The supreme court observed that the Covenant Not to Compete Act's
"core inquiry is whether [a] covenant 'contains limitations as to time, geo-
graphical area, and the scope of activity to be restrained that are reasona-
ble and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the
goodwill or other business interest of the promisee." 206 Therefore, the
supreme court explained that "overly technical disputes" regarding
whether a covenant is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement
have obscured this "core inquiry. '207 One such "technical dispute" was
the prevailing viewpoint that the "otherwise enforceable agreement" had
to be binding and enforceable at the moment the agreement was made.
In rejecting this viewpoint, the supreme court concluded that a covenant
not to compete is enforceable if: (1) it is part of, or ancillary to, an agree-
200. Id. at 646-47.
201. Id. at 647-48.
202. See id. at 648-50.
203. Id. at 649.
204. Id. at 650.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 655 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 15.50(a)).
207. See id.
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ment that contains a promise giving rise to the employer's interest in re-
straining the employee from competing; (2) the employer then makes
good on its promise and delivers the confidential information or special-
ized training; and (3) the covenant not to compete contains reasonable
limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be re-
strained.208 Based on this test, the supreme court reversed and re-
manded, explaining that Sheshunoff's agreement became enforceable
when the employer later performed its promise by providing him with
confidential information and training. 20 9
The Texas Supreme Court further rejected the employee's arguments
that the covenant was overbroad because, among other things, the restric-
tion on solicitation of certain clients and prospective clients was unrelated
to any training or confidential information he received after he entered
into the employment agreement. 210 In Sheshunoff's position, the em-
ployee continued to develop clients after he executed the agreement and
was privy to on-going confidential information relevant to competing
with his employer.21'
Based on Sheshunoff, employers are no longer required to contempo-
raneously provide an employee confidential information and training
when the employee signs an agreement containing a covenant not to com-
pete. The Sheshunoff case, however, is not expected to end litigation
over such restraints. Rather, the supreme court shifted the focus to ana-
lyzing disputes over whether a covenant is ancillary to an otherwise en-
forceable agreement within the broader context of "whether and to what
extent a restraint on competition is justified. '212
VII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 2 1 3
In Kothari, discussed supra, despite the franchisor Motiva's argument
that Kothari's PMPA claim was moot, Kothari argued that he was still
entitled to actual damages in the form of a $65-per-gas-load-delivered fee
as a result of the pending termination. Kothari argued that Motiva re-
voked his use of the electronic fund transfer system and that he was
charged $65.00 per delivery during the pendency of the action. Motiva
countered that Kothari did not actually pay this charge. Although four
loads of fuel were delivered to Kothari during the time of the lawsuit,
Motiva adduced evidence that Kothari was never invoiced for or paid the
208. Id. at 651, 656.
209. Id. at 657.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 655-56.
213. The authors comment that a notable, franchise case discussing compensatory and
punitive damages, Springs Window Fashions Division, Inc. v. Blind Maker, Inc., 184 S.W.3d
840 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. granted) was analyzed in Deborah S. Coldwell, et al.,
Franchise Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 1349, 1375-78 (Summer 2006).
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$65.00 charge. 214
In addition to actual damages, Kothari sought punitive damages and
attorneys' fees. Motiva argued that the district court should enter sum-
mary judgment on the punitive damages and attorneys' fees claim be-
cause no termination ever took effect and because Kothari was not a
"prevailing party." Kothari argued that the Agreed Preliminary Injunc-
tion entered by the district court afforded it "prevailing party" status.
The district court held that a "prevailing party is one who has been
awarded some relief by the court. Relief includes judgments on the mer-
its as well as settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree
that create the 'material alteration of the legal relationship of the par-
ties.'" 2t 5 The district court concluded that the preliminary injunction did
not dispose of Kothari's claims on the merits or affect the underlying dis-
pute but was "instead a temporary measure to preserve the status quo
pending trial on the merits. ' 216 The district court further held that
"Kothari was not a prevailing party because of Motiva's voluntary deci-
sion to rescind the notice of termination. 'A defendant's voluntary
change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff
sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur
on the change.' ",217 The district court, therefore, found that Kothari had
not achieved any relief in this lawsuit that qualified him as a "prevailing
party. '218
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Exemplary damages must be adequately pleaded. In In re Schlotzsky's,
Inc.,219 the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Schlotzsky's,
Inc. (the "Committee") sued Grant Thornton, an audit firm, for alleged
failures to properly perform fiscal year audits. The Committee asserted
that Thornton did not abide by Generally Accepted Accounting Stan-
dards ("GAAS"), which caused Schlotzsky's to become more insolvent.
The Committee asserted claims for professional negligence, breach of
contract, equitable subordination, and avoidance of preferential transfers.
The Committee also sought exemplary damages. Grant Thornton, how-
ever, argued that the Committee failed to adequately plead gross negli-
gence pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section
41.003.220
214. Kothari, 2006 WL 2129097, at *4.
215. Id. (quoting Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health &
Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835, 1839-40 (2001)).
216. Kothari, 2006 WL 2129097, at *4.
217. Id. at *5 (citing Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1841).
218. Kothari, 2006 WL 2127097, at *5.
219. 351 B.R. 430 (W.D. Tex. 2006). Co-author Robert A. Lauer served as Corporate
Counsel for Schlotzsky's, Inc., during the bankruptcy. Haynes and Boone, LLP, served as
lead bankruptcy counsel for Schlotzsky's, Inc. during the bankruptcy.
220. Id. at 440.
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The Committee claimed that Grant Thornton's argument was flawed,
since it tracked the language of the statute: ". . . when viewed objectively
from Grant Thornton's viewpoint...., Grant Thornton's conduct involved
an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of
the potential harm .... Further, Grant Thornton was subjectively aware
of the risks involved, but proceeded with conscious indifference to their
duties and to the rights and welfare of the debtors."'221 The bankruptcy
court concluded that this language satisfied the "short and plain state-
ment" requirement of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and,
therefore, withstood the motion to dismiss.222
C. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & National Distribution
Co.,223 the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
analyzed whether Sterling was entitled to injunctive relief, so that it could
distribute Schlotzsky's products until a final trial on the merits. In De-
cember 2004, Bobby Cox Companies, Inc., purchased the assets of
Schlotzsky's, Inc., ("SI")224 for $28.5 million following an auction of SI's
bankruptcy estate. Bobby Cox assigned its rights to Schlotzsky's Ltd.
("SL"). Pursuant to the sale order from the bankruptcy court, the asset
sale conveyed title to all of SI's trademarks and rights as franchisor, with-
out transferring any of SI's liabilities. 225
SL, as franchisor, had the right to approve all suppliers and distributors
of its branded and proprietary products. Effective June 2005, SL desig-
nated SYGMA and COI as the only sources for Schlotzsky's products.
During the bankruptcy proceeding, SI had previously approved Sterling
as a "non-exclusive supply chain manager," which authorized Sterling as
a distributor of Schlotzsky's products. Sterling's approval, however, was
revocable at any time. Despite Sterling's non-exclusive, revocable status,
Sterling made representations that it was an exclusive distributor. SL as-
serted that Sterling's misrepresentations threatened Schlotzsky's trade-
marks. As such, SL sought to have most, if not all, of its franchisees sign
participation agreements with SYGMA and COI. Sterling moved for a
preliminary injunction to prevent SL from excluding Sterling from partic-
ipating in SL's distribution chain. In addition to injunctive relief, Sterling
asserted claims for tortious interference with existing and prospective
contracts and relations, promissory estoppel, and negligent
misrepresentation. 226
The district court held that Sterling failed to prove that it was likely to
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. No. A-05-CA-195SS, 2006 WL 2265527 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
224. Co-author Robert A. Lauer served as Corporate Counsel for Schlotzsky's, Inc., up
to the date of the sale to Bobby Cox Companies, Inc., and testified at the trial in this case.
225. Schlotzsky's, 2006 WL 2265527, at *1.
226. Id. at *1-2.
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succeed on the merits of any of its claims. 227 In particular, the district
court held that SL did not tortiously interfere with Sterling's contracts or
relations; SL merely asserted its legitimate authority as franchisor and
trademark owner and exercised its own legal rights.228 In addition, the
district court held that Sterling could not succeed on its promissory estop-
pel or negligent misrepresentation claims, since these claims were based
on SI's alleged promises. 229 The district court emphasized that SL did not
succeed to any of SI's liabilities, under which such promissory estoppel
and misrepresentation claims would fail. 230 Moreover, the district court
held that Sterling could not reasonably have relief on any of SI's alleged
promises, given the franchise system's state under the bankruptcy. 23 1
Therefore, the district court found that Sterling had not demonstrated
there was a substantial likelihood that it would succeed on the merits of
its counterclaims.23 2
In ICEE Distributors, Inc. v. J&J Snack Foods Corp.,233 the Fifth Cir-
cuit discussed grounds for modification of a permanent injunction. ICEE
Distributors, a regional distributor, sued ICEE of America ("IOA"), the
trademark owner of ICEE, for breach of their licensing agreement as well
as J&J Snack Food Corp. and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., for trademark in-
fringement and dilution. Distributors owned a right to distribute ICEE
products in their distribution territory, including Louisiana, Arkansas,
Texas, Missouri, Alabama, and Georgia. Despite Distributors' refusal to
allow J&J to distribute its ICEE product-squeeze-up tubes-J&J sold
the tubes in Distributors' territory; Wal-Mart sold these tubes in its Sam's
Club stores.234
After a trial, the jury found J&J and Wal-Mart liable for willful trade-
mark dilution and IOA liable for breach of contract. Based on the ver-
dict, the district court entered a permanent injunction against J&J and
Wal-Mart, prohibiting the sale of squeeze tubes within Distributor's terri-
tory.235 J&J, Wal-Mart, and IOA appealed the injunction, and the court
affirmed the injunction, but solely on the basis of the breach of contract
claim.236 On remand, the district court entered a final judgment, keeping
the permanent injunction.237 The defendants then moved to vacate and
modify the judgment and moved for a new trial on the contract claim.
Although the district court denied the motion for a new trial, the court
narrowed the permanent injunction to only prohibit J&J from selling the
227. Id. at *3-5.
228. Id. at *3.
229. Id. at *34.
230. Id. at *3.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 445 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 2006).
234. Id. at 843.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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tubes in Distributors' territory.2 38 Among other things, Distributors' ap-
pealed the modification of the injunction.239
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court improperly modified the
injunction.2 40 The Fifth Circuit observed that modification of an injunc-
tion is appropriate when the legal or factual circumstances justified the
injunction have changed.2 41 Although the defendants argued to the Fifth
Circuit that the circumstances had changed, the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendants waived their right to challenge the scope of the injunction
since they did not assert this challenge to the district court.242 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in modifying
the injunction and remanded to allow the district court to reinstate the
original injunction.2 43
238. Id.
239. Id. at 844.
240. Id. at 850.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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